제목 : 중앙은행 디지털화폐 발행이 금융안정에 미치는 영향

저자 : 김영식(서울대학교 경제학부), 권오익(경제연구원 금융통화연구실)

<요약>

 본 연구는 중앙은행이 개인 대상 계좌 개설을 허용하는 방식으로 디지털 화폐를 발행하는 경우 중앙은행 디지털화폐와 상업은행 요구불예금 간 경합관계 및 금융안정에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 이를 위해 상업은행의 금융중개기능과 부분지준제도로 인한 확률적 유동성 위기가 감안된 모형을 고안하였다. 분석 결과, 중앙은행이 개인 계좌 허용 방식으로 디지털화폐를 발행하게 된다면 동 디지털화폐가 상업은행 요구불예금을 대체하면서 금융 안정을 저해하는 것으로 나타났다. 그러나, 중앙은행 디지털화폐로 대체되는 요구불예금 만큼 중앙은행이 상업은행에 대출하는 경우 상업은행의 신용공급이 축소되지 않으며 금융안정도 개선되었다.

<Abstract>

We examine the implications of central bank digital currency (CBDC) for financial stability using a monetary general equilibrium model in which (i) banks provide liquidity in the form of fiat currency, and (ii) commercial bank deposits compete with the central bank deposits in CBDC account. CBDC is a national currency-denominated, interest-bearing and account-based claim on the central bank. People have access to CBDC via direct deposit at the central bank. Claims on specific agents cannot be traded across locations due to limited communication and hence in the event of relocation an agent needs to withdraw deposits in the form of universally verified paper currency. Claims on interest-bearing CBDC is not subject to limited communication problem in the sense that it is also universally verified across locations as an account-based legal tender. The introduction of deposits in CBDC account essentially decreases supply of private credit by commercial banks, which raises the nominal interest rate and hence lowers a commercial bank's reserve-deposit ratio. This has negative effects on financial stability by increasing the likelihood of bank panic in which commercial banks are short of cash reserves to pay out to depositors. However, once the central bank can lend all the deposits in CBDC account to commercial banks, an increase in the quantity of CBDC which does not require reserve holdings can enhance financial stability by essentially increasing supply of private credit and hence lowering nominal interest rate.